The Effect Of Managerial Overconfidence On Leverage by Park, Cheonsik & Kim, Hyunseok
International Business & Economics Research Journal – December 2009 Volume 8, Number 12 
115 
The Effect Of Managerial  
Overconfidence On Leverage 
Cheonsik Park, Kyungpook National University, South Korea 
Hyunseok Kim, Kyungpook National University, South Korea 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between managerial overconfidence and leverage. 
Analyzing a sample of firms listed on Korean Stock Market during the period from 1985 to 2007, 
we use the average of the past 12 months Business Survey Index (BSI) from Bank of Korea as 
proxy measure of managerial overconfidence. We find that managers tend to issue more debts 
when they have overconfidence and this result is consistent with Oliver (2009) and Yu et al. (2006). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he main contents of capital structure theories are to explore the actual existence of optimal capital 
structure and finding it. Since the original study by Modigliani and Miller (1958), a plethora of 
research has been undertaken in attempting to identify the determinants of capital structure. These 
researches focus on the agency costs, asymmetric information, and so on. And above theories contain implicit 
assumptions that managers and investors are rational decision maker who want to get maximum utility. 
 
In a different way, many psychological studies already reported that common people tend to have 
overconfidence (Weinstein, 1980; Alicke, 1985) and this phenomenon is more frequently reveal to managers 
(Cooper et al., 1988; Landier et al., 2009). Cooper et al. (1988) made a survey about some U.S. managers and they 
found that managers generally thought the success probability of other firms is only 59%, but this probability goes 
up to 81% when it is involved in their own firms. This suggested that it is popular for managers to be overconfident. 
But continued survey was showed 66% of firms having a bad performance. Landier et al. (2009) were surveyed 
French managers and found 56% of them thought themselves can survive and only 6% of them had negative opinion 
about their future. After 3 years later, the proportions are changed that previous result is increased to 38% but 
opposite result is decreased to 17%. Besides, this phenomenon can be captured in maturing firms. Merrow et al. 
(1981) investigated the investment of equipment in energy industry of U.S. They found that managers are too 
optimistic about their cost of equipment investment, so they sometimes undervalue the cost. But the actual cost was 
twice over the valued. Statman et al. (2006) are investigated the managers of other industries and found that all of 
them have overconfidence about the cost and sales forecasting.  
 
Recently, we have recognized the irrationality of managers and investors which affects the corporate 
decision making and asset pricing. But, compare to studies about the irrational behavior of investors in financial 
decision making, not only few studies that irrational behavior of managers but also elementary. In addition, 
empirical studies of this field are inferior to those of theoretical. Since the researchers could not find appropriate 
ways to evaluate irrational behavior of managers. 
 
The studies of the irrational act for managers in financial decision making contain distortion of corporate 
investment and corporate financing. Roll (1986) suggested that managerial overconfidence result in ex-post value 
destroying merger and acquisition (M&A). Roll‟s hubris hypothesis suggests that managers are too optimistic about 
the performance of their acquisition as they overestimate the benefits of the takeover. He proposed that “If there 
were no value at all in takeover, why would firms make bids in the first place?” Roll also and analyzed the cause of 
failures of failed to learn from their own past errors and convince themselves that the valuation is right to the 
T 
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combined firm. Like Roll‟s (1986) previous study, Malmendier and Tate (2005a) showed that overconfident 
managers are more likely than the rational managers to undertake value-destroying acquisitions. Heaton (2002) 
showed that financing decisions of overconfident managers are more in the interest of shareholders than rational 
managers‟ decisions, and he suggested that overconfident or optimistic managers overestimate net present value of 
their future cash flows and overinvest when they have free cash flows. Once internal funds are exhausted and firms 
are financially constrained, they are reluctant to issue new equity because they perceive the stock of their company 
to be undervalued by the market. Therefore, overconfident managers have a high sensitivity of corporate investment 
to cash flow. Malmendier and Tate (2005b) found that investment of overconfident managers is more responsive to 
cash flow than those of rational managers using panel data on personal and corporate investment decisions of Forbes 
500 managers. Thus, managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Lin et al. (2005) 
examined the relationship between managerial overconfidence and investment based on Taiwan listed companies 
and found the same results. The issue of overconfidence and the impact has on investment decision making 
reviewed in Englmaier (2007). 
 
Although the studies that irrational behavior of investors in financial decision making have progressed, 
studies that irrational behavior of managers have tried recently (Shefrin, 2001; Heaton, 2002; Hackbarth, 2008; 
Oliver, 2009). These based on the assumption that overconfident or optimistic managers have a reduced risk 
perception and inflated expectations of future profits. Due to the manager‟s overvaluation of the project, 
overconfident or optimistic managers prefer to issue debt which pays the coupons rather than issue new equity 
which shares the future profits of firm with new stockholder. Therefore, managerial overconfidence may induce debt 
overhang (Shefrin, 2001). Although Shefrin (2001), Heaton (2002) and Hackbarth (2008) suggested the relationship 
between managerial overconfidence and leverage theoretically, these empirical studies not sufficient. It is reason for 
hard to measure overconfidence. 
 
In this paper, we examine the empirical relationship between managerial overconfidence and leverage of 
firms using appropriate proxy variable of managerial overconfidence. The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 is 
the introduction. Section 2 considers the overconfidence measure and model specifications. Section 3 describes the 
definition of individual variables and data. Section 4 documents the empirical results. Section 5 is the conclusion 
with a summary. 
 
2. OVERCONFIDENCE MEASURE AND MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
 
2.1.   Overconfidence measure 
 
Overconfidence is defined as an overestimation of one‟s own abilities and outcomes relating to one‟s 
personal situation (Langer, 1975). Measuring managerial overconfidence is one of the most difficult and important 
problems. Quantifying overconfidence is uncertain as there is no directly instrument to measure managerial 
overconfidence. The proxy variables which were used preceding literatures about managerial overconfidence can be 
summarized as follows (Jiang et al., 2008). 
 
2.2.1. Holdings of manager’s stock and stock option 
 
This was proposed first by Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b, 2008). It includes three variables: First, 
when a manager holds an option of 5years, if the option is more than 67% in-the-money at some point in year 5 but 
he does not exercise, he is regarded as overconfident. Second, if a manager holds an option until the last year of its 
duration, he is regarded as overconfident. Third, if a manager purchases additional firm stock despite their already 
high exposure to risk, he is regarded as overconfident. 
 
2.2.2. Perceptions about a manager by outsiders 
 
This approach may be the most widely used one. It was proposed first by Hayward and Hambrick (1997), 
they collected some main medias‟ evaluations about managers and classified them into six kinds and gave every 
kind an individual point respectively. Malmendier and Tate (2008) amended this measurement. They classified 
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presses‟ valuations into five kinds. Brown and Sarma (2007) adopted the same approach and used ratios to measure. 
Hribar and Yang (2006) and Jin and Kothari (2005) also used this approach. 
 
2.2.3. Upward-biased earnings forecasts by managers 
 
This was proposed first by Lin et al. (2005). Hribar and Yang (2006) and Jiang et al. (2008) also was used 
this approach in their paper. They argued that overconfident managers were apt to make upward-biased earnings 
forecasts. They first got FE=Managerial forecast for earnings before tax-Actual earning before tax, and the positive 
FE denoted upward-biases, or downward-biases. If the numbers of upward-biases are more than that of downward-
biases, the managers are regarded as overconfident. 
 
2.2.4. Frequency of M&A made by managers 
 
This was proposed first by Doukas and Petmezas (2007). They argued that the more confident the manager, 
the higher frequency the M&A. They regarded a manager as overconfident if he made at least five M&A during 
their study period. 
 
2.2.5. CEOs’ relative compensations 
 
This was proposed first by Hayward and Hambrick (1997). They argued that the higher the CEO‟s relative 
compensation to other managerial, the more important the CEO‟s position, and consequently they would be apt to be 
overconfident. They used “CEO cash compensation divided by the second-highest-paid officer” to measure. 
Similarly, Jiang et al. (2008) also used “CEO cash compensation divided by the first-three-highest-paid officer” in 
their measurement. 
 
2.2.6. Firm’s recent performance 
 
This was also proposed first by Hayward and Hambrick (1997). They used “stockholder returns for the 
twelve months prior to the date used to determine the unaffected stock price divided by the initial stock price” to 
measure. 
 
2.2.7. Booming index 
 
This was proposed first by Oliver (2009). He used proxy managerial overconfidence as the average of the 
past 12 months Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI) from the University of Michigan from 1978 to 2004. Mefteh and 
Oliver (2009) used Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) from the European Commission from 1995 to 2004. They 
analyzed the firms listed on French market and subdivided industrial companies, service firms, retail firms, 
construction firms. A possible maximum and minimum of each index is +100 and -100. Yu et al. (2006) used firms 
booming index published by National Bureau of Statistics of China to measure. A possible maximum and minimum 
of each index is 200 or 0. If the index was higher than 100, the manager of a firm that operated in one industry was 
overconfident. 
 
From these measuring above, we can see that they are more or little subjective. But we have no other 
choice. Regarding of the availability of data and the special situation of Korea, we use Business Survey Index (BSI) 
as proxy variable of managerial overconfidence, following Oliver (2009), Mefteh and Oliver (2009) and Yu et al. 
(2006). 
 
2.2.   Model specifications  
 
We examine the empirical relationship between managerial overconfidence and leverage of firms using 
financial structure variables which were used preceding literatures. Rajan and Zingales (1995) investigated the 
determinants of capital structure for G7's countries and found that market to book ratio (MB), firm size (SIZE), 
tangibility (TNG) and profitability (PRF) are common variables of the influence on the leverage. Following the 
study of Rajan and Zingales (1995), we include above variables. And we also include the proxy variable of 
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managerial overconfidence (CONF), following Oliver (2009), Mefteh and Oliver (2009), Yu et al. (2006) and 
Brettel et al. (2008). All the independent variables are lagged one year. This allows the information regarding the 
determinants of capital structure to be available to managers in the year prior to the observed level of leverage 
(Mefteh and Oliver, 2009). Therefore, we construct linear regression models which are named „basic model‟ as 
follow: 
 
                                                                                            [1] 
 
                                                                                            [2] 
 
Oliver (2009) and Yu et al. (2006) added the lagged book-value leverage (         ) or the lagged market-
value leverage (         ) to equation [1], [2] for a robustness test. Following Oliver (2009) and Yu et al. (2006), 
we include each variable to equation [1], [2] as control variable and construct linear regression models which are 
named „expansion model‟ as follow:    
 
                                                                                        [3] 
 
                                                                                        [4]     
 
In equation [3] and [4], we can estimate the adjustment speed of capital structure. In trade-off theory, the 
partial adjustment model of capital structure indicates that firms have long run target leverage and so those firms 
adjust the gap between actual and target leverage each year. Flannery and Rangan (2006), Korajczyk et al. (2007) 
and Shin (2008) proposed that adjustment speed of book-value and market-value leverage can be measured 
by       . The adjustment speed of leverage ( ) is bounded between zero and one. When   is near one of these 
boundaries, it goes rapidly adjusted to the long run target leverage and   is near zero, the adjustment is few. 
 
Given that our sample pools cross-sectional with time-series data, leverage can also be affected by macro 
factors not contained in our empirical model. Therefore, aside from OLS regressions, we also include in the 
regressions the fixed and the random effects to model the yearly effect and obtain similar results. We only report the 
results of OLS regressions in Section 4 so as to save space. 
 
3. DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
3.1.   Variables 
 
3.2.1. Explanatory variables 
 
3.1.1.1. Managerial Overconfidence (CONF) 
  
We use the average of the past 12 months Business Survey Index (BSI) from Bank of Korea from 1985 to 
2007 as proxy for managerial overconfidence (CONF). The Business Survey Index (BSI) is based on a direct survey 
about manager's current and expected economic conditions. It is also used to check for overall business cycle. The 
Business Survey Index (BSI) can be measured as follows: 
 
    
                                                        
              
         
 
The numerical value of Business Survey Index (BSI) has value of 0 to 200. If it has over (under) the 100, it 
implies that business cycle enters on an expansion (contraction) phase. 
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3.2.2. Dependent variables 
 
We use two dependent variables and then consider both book-value and market-value of leverage. Book 
ratios are conceptually different from market ratios. Market values are determined by looking forward in time. Book 
values are determined by accounting for what has already taken place. In other words book values are generally 
backward-looking measures, while market values are generally forward-looking measures (Frank and Goyal, 2003). 
Fama and French (2002), Hovakimian (2006), Welch (2004) and Flannery and Rangan (2006) tend to neglect the 
importance of the book-value leverage (BLEV), but Shin (2008), Oliver (2009) and Brettel et al. (2008) used both 
book-value leverage (BLEV) and market-value leverage (MLEV) as dependent variables. 
 
3.1.2.1.  Book-value leverage (BLEV) 
 
We use the book-value leverage (BLEV) to dependent variable in most of the empirical tests. Book-value 
leverage (BLEV) for firm i at time t, can be measured as follows: 
  
         
                            
                              
 
3.1.2.2. Market-value leverage (MLEV) 
 
Market-value leverage (MLEV) for firm i at time t, can be measured as follows: 
 
        
                           
                                               
 
 
3.2.3. Control variables 
 
3.1.3.1. Market to book ratio (MB) 
  
We use the market to book ratio (MB) as variable of growth or investment opportunities. Under the trade-
off theory, the market to book ratio (MB) has negatively related to leverage. Long and Malitz (1985) showed that 
firms with growth opportunities have lower leverage than those facing those facing tangible investments. Low 
growth firms with tangible can support more debt because of the ability of potential bondholders to estimate 
underinvestment and to observe and monitor investment decisions. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that highly 
leveraged firms can experience the asset substitution problem and underinvestment problem. Frank and Goyal (2009) 
argued that if the firms have abundant investment opportunities, their investment opportunities negatively related to 
leverage. Titman and Wessels (1988) argued that firms with growth opportunities reduce the leverage to avoid the 
asset substitution problem and underinvestment problem, which could result from the agency conflicts. Under the 
pecking order theory, the market to book ratio (MB) has positively related to leverage. Myers (1984) argues that 
retained earnings are better than debt and debt is better than equity. Thus, firms have growth or investment 
opportunities increase the leverage when invested capitals of the firms exceed retained earnings. Market to book 
ratio (MB) for firm i at time t, can be measured as follows: 
 
      
                                                     
                             
 
 
3.1.3.2. Firm size (SIZE) 
 
Under the trade-off theory, firm size (SIZE) has positively related to leverage (Frank and Goyal, 2003). 
Firm size (SIZE) affects a leverage through the default risk and bankruptcy cost. Flath and Knoeber (1980) and 
Booth et al. (2001) argue that larger firms can be increased the debt capacity because they can conduct a business 
diversification more easily and have a lower probability of bankruptcy and volatility of cash flow. Chittenden et al. 
(1996) argue that larger firms have more leverage because they have lower monitoring costs and then they can 
reduce the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection. On the other hand, the pecking order theory argues that 
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firm size (SIZE) has negatively related to leverage because larger firms have less asymmetry information problem as 
compared with small firms and then they prefer to issue equity instead of debt (Fama and French, 2002). The natural 
logarithm of total assets or total sales is commonly considered a proxy for the size of each firm. In this paper, firm 
size (SIZE) for firm i at time t, can be measured as follows: 
 
                             
 
3.1.3.3. Tangibility (TNG)  
 
Tangible assets provide better collateral for loans and are expected to support debt since they can be 
pledged as collateral. As expected the more collateral firms have, the greater the leverage (Frank and Goyal, 2003). 
If firms have abundant tangible fixed assets and inventories, they have a better collateral value (Scott, 1977). Stulz 
and Johnson (1985) argue that firms have financed the secured debt can increase their firm value because it can 
reduce the underinvestment problem. Tangible assets are less subject to informational asymmetries and usually have 
a greater value than intangible assets in case of bankruptcy (Johnson, 1997). Additionally, the moral hazard risks are 
reduced when the firm offers tangible assets as collateral, because this constitutes a positive signal to the debt 
holders (Oliver, 2009). Tangibility (TNG) is related to collateral but it excludes short-term assets. Tangibility (TNG) 
for firm i at time t, can be measured as follows: 
 
       
                                       
               
 
 
3.1.3.4 Firm Profitability (PRF) 
 
Under the trade-off theory, firms with high profitability (PRF) have low bankruptcy cost and high tax 
shield effect and so they will use more debt. The pecking order theory predicts that more profitable firms will have 
less leverage. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that firms with high profitability (PRF) have low leverage because 
they are more likely that financing would be from internal sources rather than external sources. Titman and Wessels 
(1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) also argue that the firm profitability (PRF) is negatively related to leverage. 
On the other hand, Jensen (1986) argues that firm managers of the highly profitable firms may be tempted to 
overspend their fee cash flow, so high debt is useful to control the overspending problem. The firm profitability 
(PRF) for firm i at time t, can be measured as follows: 
 
       
         
               
 
 
3.2.   Data 
 
The sample consists of firms listed on Korean stock market during the period from 1985 to 2007. Financial 
firms are excluded because they are subjected to legal regulations regarding capital structure. We also eliminate 
some data which did not maintain their settlement term as December. All the accounting and financial statement 
data are sourced from the Korea Information Service (KIS-value). The Business Survey Index as proxy variable of 
managerial overconfidence (CONF) is sourced from Bank of Korea. Based on this procedure, our data include total 
516 firms or 10,848 firm-years. Descriptive statistics for these firms are provided in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
BLEV MLEV CONF MB SIZE TNG PRF 
Mean 0.6228 0.7152 95.4523 0.9372 25.5780 0.3562 0.0896 
Standard deviation 0.2357 0.2370 16.2414 0.3717 1.5413 0.1692 0.0688 
Maximum 4.7341 1.0000 124.0000 6.8557 31.8089 0.9189 0.5648 
Minimum 0.0260 0.0246 57.2500 0.2118 18.0550 0.0000 -0.4680 
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As shown in Table 1, the average value of book-value leverage (BLEV) over the sample period is 62.28% 
and the market-value leverage (MLEV) over the sample period is 71.52%. Based on book values, on average firms 
have 62.28% leverage which is higher than Son and Lee (2007) who report leverage at 47.40% and Shin (2008) who 
report leverage at 56.17%. Based on market values, on average firms have 71.52% leverage which is higher than 
Son and Lee (2007) who report leverage at 53.29% and Shin (2008) who report leverage at 58.83%. The average 
value of managerial overconfidence (CONF) over the sample period is approximately 95 and the maximum value is 
124.00 the minimum value is 57.25. The average value of market to book ratio (MB) is 0.9372, firm size (SIZE) is 
25.5870, tangibility (TNG) is 0.3562 and firm profitability (PRF) is 0.0896. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1. Pearson correlation coefficient 
 
 
Table 2: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
*, **, and *** indicate significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively (Two tailed test) 
 
 
Table 2 reports results of correlation between variables. The correlation between managerial 
overconfidence (CONF) and book-value leverage (BLEV) are positive and significant at 1% level and the 
correlation between managerial overconfidence (CONF) and market-value leverage (MLEV) are positive and 
significant at 5% level. The correlation between market to book ratio (MB) and book-value leverage (BLEV) are 
positive and significant at the 1% level and the correlation between market to book ratio (MB) and market-value 
leverage (MLEV) are negative and significant at 1% level. The correlation between firm size (SIZE) and book-value 
leverage (BLEV) are negative and significant at 5% level and the correlation between firm size (SIZE) and market-
value leverage (MLEV) are negative and significant at 1% level. The correlation between tangibility (TNG) and 
book-value leverage (BLEV) are positive and significant at 1% level and the correlation between tangibility (TNG) 
and market-value leverage (MLEV) are also positive and significant at 1% level. The correlation between firm 
profitability (PRF) and book-value leverage (BLEV) are negative and significant at 1% level but the correlation 
between firm profitability (PRF) and market-value leverage (MLEV) is not statistically significant.  
 
4.2. The results of multiple regression analysis 
 
4.2.1. The effect of managerial overconfidence on book-value leverage 
 
The results of regression equation [1] and [3] whose dependent variables are book-value leverage (BLEV) 
and explanatory variables are managerial overconfidence (CONF) are shown in Table 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BLEV MLEV CONF MB SIZE TNG PRF 
BLEV 1.000 
      
MLEV 
0.6233*** 
(0.0000) 
1.000 
     
CONF 
0.1023*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0269** 
(0.0148) 
1.000 
    
MB 
0.1898*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3053*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0048 
(0.6579) 
1.000 
   
SIZE 
-0.0248** 
(0.0116) 
-0.1340*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0947*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0855*** 
(0.0000) 
1.000 
  
TNG 
0.0645*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1227*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0056 
(0.6096) 
-0.0869*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1311*** 
(0.0000) 
1.000 
 
PRF 
-0.0822*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0096 
(0.3264) 
0.0782*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0404*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0788*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0068 
(0.4832) 
1.000 
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Table 3: The effect of managerial overconfidence on book-value leverage 
 
                                                                                       [1] 
                                                                                       [3] 
Classification Basic model Expansion model 
Variable 
 
Coefficient VIF Coefficient VIF 
CONF    
0.0022*** 
(9.0461) 
1.0282 
0.0007*** 
(4.0699) 
1.0537 
MB    
0.0993*** 
(11.7345) 
1.0550 
0.0525*** 
(8.4335) 
1.0780 
SIZE    
0.0116*** 
(3.9424) 
1.0671 
0.0064*** 
(3.0089) 
1.0688 
TNG    
0.1476*** 
(6.5255) 
1.0259 
0.0516*** 
(3.1289) 
1.0384 
PRF    
-0.3897*** 
(-6.6699) 
1.0503 
-0.2108*** 
(-4.9611) 
1.0561 
Adjustment speed ( )        
0.3842 
 
Adjusted R2 0.0841 0.5251 
( ): indicate t-Statistic, *, **, and *** indicate significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
In the basic model, the coefficient on the variable of managerial overconfidence (CONF) is positive and 
significant. This result implies that when the variable of managerial overconfidence (CONF) is higher, firms have 
higher leverage. “This supports the notion that overconfidence or optimism causes managers to overestimate the 
future return to their investment project and underestimate the risk of decision outcomes. This leads corporate 
managers to use more debt financing when they are overconfident (Oliver, 2009).” This result is consistent with 
Oliver (2009) and Yu et al. (2006). 
 
The market to book ratio (MB) as a proxy for growth or investment opportunities is positively and 
significantly related to book-value leverage (BLEV) at 1% level. This is supported by pecking order theory and 
consistent with Welch (2004), Hovakimian (2006), Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Shin (2008). The firm size 
(SIZE) is positively and significantly related to book-value leverage (BLEV) at 1% level. This is supported by trade-
off theory and consistent with Flath and Knoeber (1980), Booth et al. (2001) and Chittenden et al. (1996). The 
tangibility (TNG) as a proxy for collateral value is positively and significantly related to book-value leverage 
(BLEV) at 1% level. This also supports that firms with higher tangibility are likely to have lower informational 
asymmetries, as well as lower bankruptcy risk and moral hazard risks. This is consistent with Scott (1977), Stulz and 
Johnson (1985), Johnson (1997), Frank and Goyal (2003), Shin (2008) and Oliver (2009). The firm profitability 
(PRF) is negatively and significantly related to book-value leverage (BLEV) at 1% level. This is supported by 
pecking order theory and consistent with Myers and Majluf (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) and Shin (2008). 
 
In the expansion model which added the lagged term of the book-value leverage (       ) to the basic 
model, the coefficient on the variable of managerial overconfidence (CONF) is positive and significant. This result 
implies that when the variable of managerial overconfidence (CONF) is higher, firms have higher leverage. It is 
similar for market to book ratio (MB), firm size (SIZE), tangibility (TNG) and profitability (PRF) to affect on the 
book-value leverage (BLEV). The coefficient on the lagged term of the book-value leverage (       ) is positive 
and significant at 1% level. And also the numerical value of coefficient is 0.6158 and then we can estimate the 
adjustment speed of book-value leverage at 0.3842 which is measured by „one minus the numerical value of 
coefficient on the lagged term of the book-value leverage (       )‟.  
 
4.2.2. The effect of managerial overconfidence on market-value leverage 
 
The results of regression equation [2] and [4] whose dependent variables are market-value leverage (MLEV) 
and explanatory variables are managerial overconfidence (CONF) are shown in Table 4. 
 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – December 2009 Volume 8, Number 12 
123 
Table 4: The effect of managerial overconfidence on market-value leverage 
 
                                                                                        [2] 
                                                                                        [4] 
Classification Basic model Expansion model 
Variable 
 
Coefficient VIF Coefficient VIF 
CONF  1 
0.0017*** 
(6.8613) 
1.0282 
-0.0000 
(-0.3345) 
1.0518 
MB  2 
-0.1353*** 
(-15.8801) 
1.0550 
-0.0544*** 
(-11.1165) 
1.1011 
SIZE  3 
0.0070** 
(2.3459) 
1.0671 
0.0008 
(0.4877) 
1.0689 
TNG  4 
0.2008*** 
(8.8149) 
1.0259 
0.0285** 
(2.2136) 
1.0526 
PRF  5 
-0.3780*** 
(-6.4251) 
1.0503 
-0.1689*** 
(-5.1184) 
1.0557 
Adjustment speed ( ) 1  6   
0.1804 
 
Adjusted R2 0.1396 0.7332 
( ): indicate t-Statistic, *, **, and *** indicate significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively 
 
 
In the basic model, the coefficient on the variable of managerial overconfidence (CONF) is positive and 
significant. This result implies that when the variable of managerial overconfidence (CONF) is higher, firms have 
higher leverage. This is consistent with Oliver (2009) and Yu et al. (2006). 
 
The market to book ratio (MB) as a proxy for growth or investment opportunities is negatively and 
significantly related to market-value leverage (MLEV) at 1% level. This result implies that firms have growth or 
investment opportunities decrease the leverage and consistent with the trade-off theory. The firm size (SIZE) is 
positively and significantly related to market-value leverage (MLEV) at 5% level. This is supported by trade-off 
theory and consistent with Flath and Knoeber (1980), Booth et al. (2001) and Chittenden et al. (1996). The 
tangibility (TNG) as a proxy for collateral value is positively and significantly related to market-value leverage 
(MLEV) at 1% level. This is consistent with Scott (1977), Stulz and Johnson (1985), Johnson (1997), Frank and 
Goyal (2003), Shin (2008) and Oliver (2009). The firm profitability (PRF) is negatively and significantly related to 
market-value leverage (MLEV) at 1% level. This is supported by pecking order theory and consistent with Myers 
and Majluf (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Shin (2008). 
 
In the expansion model which added the lagged term of the market-value leverage (MLEVt 1) to the basic 
model, the coefficient on the variable of managerial overconfidence (CONF) is not significant. It is similar for 
market to book ratio (MB), firm size (SIZE), tangibility (TNG) and profitability (PRF) to affect on the market-value 
leverage (MLEV). The coefficient on the lagged term of the market-value leverage (MLEVt 1) is positive and 
significant at 1% level. And also the numerical value of coefficient is 0.8196 and then we can estimate the 
adjustment speed of market-value leverage at 0.1804 which is measured by „one minus the numerical value of 
coefficient on the lagged term of the market-value leverage (MLEVt 1)‟. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we examine the empirical relationship between managerial overconfidence and leverage of 
firms listed on Korean Stock Market during the period from 1985 to 2007. Following Oliver (2009), Mefteh and 
Oliver (2009) and Yu et al. (2006), we use the Business Survey Index (BSI) as proxy measure of managerial 
overconfidence. The model specifications and main results of this study can be summarized as follows. 
 
First, we construct the basic models whose dependent variable is leverage and explanatory variable is 
managerial overconfidence (CONF) and control variables are market to book ratio (MB), firm size (SIZE), 
tangibility (TNG) and profitability (PRF), following Rajan and Zingales (1995), Oliver (2009) and Yu et al. (2006). 
In the basic model, managerial overconfidence (CONF) is positively and significantly related to both book-value 
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leverage (BLEV) and market-value leverage (MLEV). All the control variables (MB, SIZE, TNG, PRF) are 
significantly related to both book-value leverage (BLEV) and market-value leverage (MLEV). 
 
Second, we construct the expansion model which added the lagged term of the leverage the basic model. In 
the expansion model, managerial overconfidence (CONF) is significantly positive to book-value leverage (BLEV), 
but not significant market-value leverage (MLEV). All the control variables (MB, SIZE, TNG, PRF) are 
significantly related to book-value leverage (BLEV) and most control variables (MB, TNG, PRF) are significantly 
related to market-value leverage (MLEV). We estimate also the adjustment speed of book-value leverage at 0.3842 
and the adjustment speed of market-value leverage at 0.1804. 
 
Conclusively, managerial overconfidence (CONF) is significantly related to leverage except one case of the 
expansion model. These results imply that managerial overconfidence may lead to increase leverage and consistent 
with Oliver (2009) and Yu et al. (2006). 
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